MR
JAY: Your full name, please, Mrs Brooks?
A.
Rebekah Mary Brooks.
Q.
May I ask you, please, to look at the large file in front of you and
identify the two witness statements you have provided us with. The
first is under tab 1 a statement dated 14 October of last year, and
secondly under tab 2, a statement dated 2 May of this year. The
principal focus today will be on the second statement, but are you
content to confirm the truth of both statements?
A.
Yes.
Q.
I'll attempt a timeline of your career, Mrs Brooks....
(…)
Q.
Didn't you ever examine the motives or thought processes of
politicians, why they were wanting to get close to you, and just,
even as a piece of self-indulgence, pondered to yourself: "Well,
what's going on here? Why are they trying to get close to me?"
A.
I think I always examined the ulterior motivates of politicians, but
I thought it was pretty obvious that they wanted to get to -- I don't
know a politician that would turn down a meeting with a senior
journalist from any broadcast or any newspaper. So it wasn't – it
didn't need a lot of thinking that politicians wanted to get access
to journalists. I mean, that's been the same case for decades, as you
-- as you pointed out in your opening statement in this module.
Q.
But you were in possession of the megaphone which would be of utility
to them, and which, if they had access to, logically and
self-evidently, might have influence over your readership. That's the
truth, isn't it?
A.
I think the politicians were very keen to put their case to me and my
team at the Sun because of the large readership of the Sun.
Q.
Did you regard it as part of your role -- or, if you didn't, perhaps
it was an accidental by-product of your role as editor in particular
-- to build up friendships with politicians?
A.
I think some friendships did occur, but I think it's important to put
it in the context of friendships. I mean, we all have lots of
different friendships. Old friends, new friends, work colleagues,
associates. And, you know, through the decade that I was a national
newspaper editor and the years I was CEO and the ten years I was a
journalist, some friendships were made. But I don't think I ever
forgot I was a journalist and I don't think they ever forgot they
were a politician.
Q.
Did you not understand that you did have a degree of personal power
over politicians?
A.
No. Again, I just didn't see it like that. I saw my role as editor of
the Sun as a very responsible one and I enjoyed my job and every part
of that job, but particularly, as I've said in my witness statement,
I enjoyed campaigns and I enjoyed bridging a gap between public
opinion and public policy, taking on concerns of the readers. So I
don't accept it in the power terms that you keep describing it as.
Q.
But your real interest is people, isn't it, Mr Brooks? You're a very
empathetic person. You understand how human beings think and feel,
don't you?
A.
I do like people, yes, and journalists, as a main, do try and be
empathetic, otherwise no one would tell them anything.
Q.
But you understand the potential of, if I can put it in this way,
personal alchemy, how you with get people to do or might get people
to do what you want, and indeed what they are trying to do with you.
Don't you get any of that?
A.
I'm not sure quite what you mean.
Q.
I'm not suggest anything sinister here. I'm talking about really the
power of human empathy. Some people are empathetic and it's
completely lost on them. But it's not lost on you, is it?
A.
Well, I hope to be empathetic in life to people, yes.
Q.
I just wonder whether you sense or sensed – because we're talking
about the past now -- the effect you might have had on politicians.
Some of them may even have been afraid of you. Is that true?
A.
I literally -- like I say, I don't see politicians as these sort of
easily scared people. Like I say, most of them are pretty strong,
ambitious and highly motivated,so ...
Q.
Let's see if we can just take one case study and see whether there's
any validity in that case study.
A.
Okay, right.
Q.
You remember the McCanns serialisation case?
A.
Yes, I do.
Q.
Actually, we have Dr McCann's evidence in relation to this in the
bundle at page 57 under tab 6. Do you have that there? We're working
from the transcript of the evidence this Inquiry received on 23
November 2011.
A.
Right, yes.
Q.
If you look at page 57, line 11, the question I asked was: "You
talk about a meeting with Rebekah Brooks …" Are you on the
right page?
A.
They're not numbered in that way.
LORD
JUSTICE LEVESON: They are, actually.
A.
57, is it? At the bottom?
LORD
JUSTICE LEVESON: No, it says 15 at the bottom, but each page has four
pages on it.
A.
Yes, right. I have it, sorry. Thank you, sir. Yes?
MR
JAY: The question was: "You talk about a meeting with Rebekah
Brooks which led to a review of your case, a formal review. Just to
assist us a little bit with that, can you recall when that was?"
Dr
McCann's answer was: "I think it's probably worth just
elaborating a little bit because it's quite a complex decision-making
process. News International actually bid for the rights to the book
along with HarperCollins, and one of their pitches was the fact that
they would serialise the book across all their titles. We were
somewhat horrified at the prospect of that, given the way we had been
treated in the past and the deal was actually done with the
publishers, Transworld, that excluded serialisation. "Now, we
were subsequently approached by News International and Associated to
serialise the book, and after much deliberation, we had a couple of
meetings with the general manager and -- Will Lewis and Rebekah
Brooks and others, and what swung the decisionto serialise was News
International committed to backing the campaign and the search for
Madeleine." Pausing there, there was going to be serialisation
in both the Sunday Times and the Sun, I believe. Do you
recall
that?
A.
I do.
Q.
I think this is the year 2010, by which time you were chief executive
officer, weren't you?
A.
That's correct.
Q.
What was the price that you paid for the serialisation?
Can
you remember?
A.
I can't remember, actually. I -- it's hundreds of thousands of
pounds.
Q.
A million, we've been told.
A.
No, it wasn't. It wasn't a million. Half a million, maybe. I can't
remember. I mean, I can -- there are ways to find out, but I'm not
sure it was a million.
Q.
Okay. I paraphrase the rest of what Dr McCann said, because he
couldn't take this issue much further. Your intervention was
successful in securing a review of the case. Do you understand that?
A.
I -- you asked if it was successful and he says it was, yes.
Q.
Yes. Can you remember anything about that intervention?
A.
Actually, to just go back, the reason I was involved as chief
executive was because it concerned two newspapers, the Sunday Times
and the Sun. So if you like, I did the deal with HarperCollins from
the corporate point of view, and then left it to the two editors,
John Witherow and Dominic Mohan, to decide the different approaches.
I had always got on very well with Dr McCann and Kate McCann
throughout their incredible traumatic time, and in fact I think they,
if asked, would be very
positive
about the Sun, actually, and in this case, I thought that Dominic
Mohan's idea to run the campaign for this review of Madeleine's case
by the Home Secretary was the right thing for the Sun to do, and I
think the Sunday Times did the book. So my intervention was at that
point, as in: was the original discussion with Dr McCann. I don't
think I spoke to Theresa May directly, but I am pretty sure that
Dominic Mohan may have done.
Q.
Let's see whether we can agree or disagree on what may have happened.
When you were discussing the arrangements with the McCanns, you asked
if there was anything more they wanted. Do you recall that?
A.
Maybe, yes.
Q.
And Dr Gerry McCann said that he wanted a UK police review of the
case. Do you remember him saying?
A.
That I do, yes.
Q.
Do you remember your answer being: "Is that all?"
A.
I may have said it slightly more politely: "Is there anything
else before we conclude this meeting?", but – I don't
particularly remember saying that, but maybe I did, yes.
Q.
I'm not suggesting to you that it was impolite; I'm just summarising
the gist of what you said.
A.
Maybe, yes. We had been going through a list of issues that Dr McCann
and Kate McCann wanted to be assured of before we went forward with
the serialisation, so possibly.
Q.
Did you then take the matter up with Downing Street direct?
A.
No.
Q.
Did you not tell Downing Street that the Sun was going to demand a
review and the Prime Minister should agree to the request because the
Sun had supported him at the last election?
A.
No, in fact I didn't speak to Downing Street or the Home Secretary
about this, but I know that Dominic Mohan or Tom Newton Dunn will
have spoken to them.
Q.
Pardon me?
A.
They would have spoken directly to either Number 10 or the Home
Office. I'm not sure. You'll have to ask them. Probably the Home
Office, I would have thought.
Q.
That the Sun wanted an immediate result and that a letter would be
posted all over the front page from the McCanns to the Prime Minister
asking for a review, unless Downing Street agreed. Did that happen?
A.
I think that's how the Sun launched the campaign from memory. It was
with a letter, yes.
Q.
The Home Secretary was told that if she agreed to the review, the
page 1 letter would not run. Do you remember that?
A.
No, I don't.
Q.
But as the Secretary of State did not respond in time, you did
publish the letter on the front page. Do you remember that?
A.
I do remember the Sun kicking off the campaign with a letter, yes.
Q.
But you don't believe there was any conversation or indeed threat to
the Secretary of State? Is that right?
A.
I'm pretty sure there would have not been a threat, but you'll have
to -- we'll have to ask Dominic Mohan, because, like I said, my
involvement was to discuss the campaign in the continued search for
Madeleine with the McCanns and to do the deal on the book and to --
they – because I had done so many campaigns in the past, they
wanted my opinion, but after that I left it to both
editors
to execute the campaign.
Q.
What I've been told is that you then intervened personally, Mrs
Brooks. You told Number 10 that unless the Prime Minister ordered the
review by the Metropolitan Police, the Sun would put the Home
Secretary, Theresa May, on the front page every day
until
the Sun's demands were met. Is that true or not?
A.
No.
Q.
Is any part of that true?
A.
I didn't speak to Number 10 or the Home Office about the McCanns
until, I think, after the campaign had been won, and then it came up
in a conversation that I had – and I don't even think directly with
the Prime Minister. I think it was one of his team.
Q.
We can find out in due course whether this is true or not, but I must
repeat it to you. It is said that you directly intervened with the
Prime Minister and warned him that unless there was a review by the
Metropolitan Police, the Sun would put the Home Secretary, Theresa
May, on the front page every day until the Sun's demands were met. Is
that true or not?
A.
I did not say to the Prime Minister: "I will put Theresa May on
the front page of the Sun every day unless you give me a review."
I did not say that. If I'd had any conversations with Number 10
directly, they wouldn't have been particularly about that, but they
would have been, if I'd been having a conversation, that the Sun was
leading a major campaign with a very strong letter on page 1 to start
the campaign, and anyone who knew me would have talked to me -- any
politician would have talked to me about it. But I did not say that.
I don't know who said I said that, but we're going back to sources
again.
LORD
JUSTICE LEVESON: Could we ask this: were you part of a strategy that
involved your paper putting pressure on the government with this sort
of implied or express threat?
A.
I was certainly part of a strategy to launch the campaign in order to
get the review for the McCanns, yes. But I think the word "threat",
sir, is -- is too strong.
LORD
JUSTICE LEVESON: Well, give me another word then for "threat",
could you?
A.
Persuade them?
LORD
JUSTICE LEVESON: Persuasion. All right.
9
MR
JAY: In your own words, Mrs Brooks, define for us what the strategy
was.
A.
So the McCanns were deeply upset that there hadn't been a review. It
seemed incredibly unfair that they hadn't
got
this review. You only have to read their book to understand the
trauma that they go through. So we said,
"We'll
join forces with you", and Dominic Mohan and his team went away
and constructed a campaign. I cannot
remember
when the idea of the letter came up. It may have even been my idea to
do the letter. I can't
remember.
But the campaign was launched in order to try and convince the
government or convince the Home
Secretary
that a review would be the right thing to do.
Q.
Do you know how it came about that the review was ordered?
A.
No, I -- I can't remember, I'm sorry. Such a lot has happened since
then, but --
Q.
You must have been told, Mrs Brooks?
A.
I remember Dominic Mohan telling me that the review was going ahead.
Q.
That the Sun had won, in other words?
A.
He didn't put it in those terms, but he said – well, actually, I
think he said, "The McCanns have won."
Q.
The Sun headline on 14 May, front page, was that as a result of its
campaign, the Prime Minister was "opening the Maddie files".
Do you remember that one?
A.
I remember the Sun winning the campaign, the McCanns winning the
campaign, yes.
Q.
So this is not, you say, a case study then in the exercise of power
by you? I'm not suggesting that the end result was right or wrong.
Many would say it was right, that there should be a review. I'm just
saying the means by which you achieved the objective --
A.
But it could be said that a review of Madeleine McCann's case, with
everything that had gone on, was the right thing to do. We presented
the issue. We supported the McCanns in their determination to get a
review. It wasn't new. They'd tried before, before the election, and
the election had come into -- and the Sun -- and the Home Secretary
clearly thought it was a good idea too, because I'm pretty sure there
wasn't -- it wasn't a long campaign. It wasn't like Sarah's Law over
ten years. I think it was very short.
Q.
Yes, it didn't take very long because the government yielded to your
pressure, didn't they? It took all of about a day.
A.
Or perhaps they were convinced by our argument.
Q.
There are always two sides to the coin here, that of course everybody
would say, on one level, money should be spent, but the campaign to
date, I'm told, has cost £2 million and some would say maybe that
money might have gone somewhere else. It's never clearcut, is it?
A.
What, the Madeleine McCann campaign?
Q.
No, the operation which started up the review, which was called
Operation Grange, I understand.
A.
Right, sorry.
Q.
Perhaps you would say all you were doing was reflecting the views of
your readers. Is that it?
A.
I think in that case, it was an issue that we brought to the readers,
that we explained to the readers that a review hadn't taken place and
that -- we presented the McCanns' story as in the reason why they
wanted the review. I think that absolutely chimed with our readership
and the campaign was started with a very heartfelt letter and the
politicians were convinced our argument, or the McCanns' argument,
was correct.
Q.
It also chimes with the commercial interests of your papers because
this sells copy, doesn't it?
A.
Well, campaigns can sell newspapers. I think the serialisation of the
book actually was good for
circulation
for the Sunday Times. I'm not sure how well the campaign was in
circulation terms, but they would be a matter of record. It may have
been.
Q.
Can I deal, finally before lunch, with one other example just to get
your evidence on this. Mr Dominic Grieve at one point was the Shadow
Home Secretary, wasn't he?
A.
Yes, he was.
Q.
Do you remember a conversation with him over dinner which you
discussed the Human Rights Act?
A.
I do, yes.
Q.
To cut to the quick, his position was in favour of the Act and your
position was not, if one wanted to distill it into one sentence; is
that correct?
A.
I don't think that's quite right. Similar. His position was that it
was -- it was a shadow cabinet dinner, and his position was that
David Cameron's promise or, shall we say, the Tory Party's promise to
repeal the HRA and replace it with a British bill of rights, I think
was the plan at the time, was not – should not be so easily
promised to papers like the Sun and the Mail and the Telegraph, and
so it wasn't that he was pro it or against it. He was just making the
legal point that it was very difficult to do.
Q.
Were you impressed with him after that conversation?
A.
Well, as it turned out, he was absolutely right, but at the time --
it was more his colleagues around the table, because I think they'd
put out a policy announcement that it was going to be in the
manifesto they would repeal the HRA. David Cameron had written for
the Sun explaining this. And so the dinner conversation was quite
heated, as he was the only one at the table saying, "Actually
..." I admired him standing up to his shadow colleagues like
that, and as I say, in the end he's turned out to be correct.
Q.
Didn't you tell Mr Cameron, after that conversation you had with Mr
Grieve, words to this effect: "You can't have someone like that
as Home Secretary. He won't appeal on our readers. Move him"?
And that's indeed what happened.
A.
No, I did not tell Mr Cameron to move him. What – the conversation
-- as I say, it was a very heated conversation, borne out by -- his
colleagues were trying to almost silence him at the table because he
was, in effect, saying one of the promises the Conservatives had made
to the electorate was they were going to repeal – and it was almost
the opposite way around, that they were concerned that his view was
not to be taken seriously, and as it turned out, he was entirely
correct.
Q.
Did you give any advice to Mr Cameron as to whether Mr Grieve might
move on?
A.
No, no. In fact, after that conversation -- sorry, it is important to
remember Mr Cameron wasn't at that dinner.
Q.
That's right. Did you indicate to Mr Cameron in any way what your
view was about Mr Grieve?
A.
No. In fact, Mr Osborne and Mr Cameron did the opposite to me, where
they were at pains to explain that Mr Grieve's view, which has now
proved to be entirely correct, was absolutely not their view and they
were going to repeal the HRA and replace it with a British bill of
rights, and that Mr Grieve was mistaken.
LORD
JUSTICE LEVESON: Just before we break, could I take you back to this
issue that we've bounced around several times, which is who is
leading who.
A.
Yes.
LORD
JUSTICE LEVESON: Do you think that at least in part, what you were in
fact doing, to use your own words, was bringing issues to your
readers as opposed merely to responding to your readers' interests?
A.
I think that's correct, yes.
LORD
JUSTICE LEVESON: I'm sure we'll come back to it this afternoon, but I
would like your view, which you can reflect upon, on this:
everybody's entitled to be a friend of whomsoever they want to be a
friend. That's part of life. But can you understand why it might be a
matter of public concern that a very close relationship between
journalists and politicians might create subtle pressures on the
press, who have the megaphone, and on the politicians, who have the
policy decisions?
A.
Yes, I can understand that.
LORD
JUSTICE LEVESON: All right. 2 o'clock.
(The
luncheon adjournment)
